Volume 8
Issue 2 Spring 1968
Spring 1968

Indian Industrail Development and the Courts
William C. Schaab

Recommended Citation
William C. Schaab, Indian Industrail Development and the Courts, 8 Nat. Resources J. 303 (1968).
Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nrj/vol8/iss2/6

This New Mexico Section is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UNM Digital
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Natural Resources Journal by an authorized editor of UNM Digital
Repository. For more information, please contact amywinter@unm.edu, lsloane@salud.unm.edu,
sarahrk@unm.edu.

INDIAN INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT
AND THE COURTS
WILLIAM C. SCHAAB*

If Congress enacts the "Indian Resources Development Act of
1967", now pending before it1 courts will receive for the first time a
clear grant of jurisdiction over controversies with Indian tribes or
tribal corporations formed pursuant to that Act. This innovation is
justified in the bill as a means of opening up "private financial and
credit markets" to Indian tribes, and enabling them "to exercise initiative and self-determination" in the management of their lands and
resources.
Under Title II of the bill 2 the Secretary of the Interior3 may
issue "a charter of incorporation" to carry on "any lawful enterprise" on or near an Indian reservation. The charter may be issued
upon application of the governing body of a tribe or of a group of
Indians acting with approval of the governing body. The corporation may be a stock or membership corporation, but stock ownership
or membership will be limited to individual Indians or Indian tribes.
The corporation may acquire and dispose of property (including
restricted property), may contract, borrow money, and mortgage its
properties. It may sue or be sued in the federal courts without regard
to diversity of citizenship or jurisdictional amount. However, a
money judgment against the corporation may not be satisfied from
trust or restricted property unless such property is "specifically hypothecated to performance of the contract sued upon. ' 4 Such a cor* Member of the New Mexico bar.
1. H.R. 10560 and S.1816, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), introduced at Secretary
Udall's request, are now pending before the Committees on Interior and Insular
Affairs. Hearings before both committees were held in July, 1967.
2. Title I of the bill contains a variety of benefits, including an Indian Development
Loan Authority to promote industrial, commercial, and agricultural enterprises, guaranties of loans not otherwise obtainable, revolving fund loans, and authority to issue taxexempt tribal bonds.
3. Hereinafter sometimes referred to simply as the Secretary.
4. Similar provisions have regularly been included in corporate charters issued
under the Indian Reorganization Act. 25 U.S.C. §477 (1964). In Maryland Casualty
Co. v. Citizens National Bank of West Hollywood, 361 F.2d 517 (5th Cir. 1966), the
bonding company was prevented from collecting a judgment against such a tribal
corporation by garnishment, although the corporate charter referred to "the levy
of any judgment, lien or attachment." See note 41 infra. However, the grant of Federal
question jurisdiction in suits against a chartered corporation under the Act is new in
the pending bill.
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poration "shall not be an agency or instrumentality of the United
States for any purpose." The Secretary may revoke a corporate
charter "whenever in his judgment the dissolution of the corporation would be in the best interests of the stockholders or members." 5
Power to deal with tribal property can be obtained without incorporation by an Indian tribe under Title III of the bill. Upon application by the governing body, the Secretary may authorize the tribe
to sell, mortgage, or dispose of (but not to lease) its restricted lands
or trust funds subject to broad safeguards to prevent waste.' Nontrust property may be dealt with by the tribe "in like manner as any
other owner of similar property" without Secretarial approval.
The bill authorizes any tribe to waive in writing "any immunity
against suit it may possess," and grants to federal courts jurisdiction
"to entertain suits against the tribe in such cases."' 7 In any action to
levy upon trust or restricted property which may have been "specifically hypothecated" under the contract sued on, the United States is
an indispensable party.'
Enactment of such provisions will make obsolete the traditional
judicial view that courts should not intervene in Indian matters without express approval by Congress. The federal courts will then be
opened for the determination of disputes between a non-Indian
business with interests on the reservation and the proprietary tribe.
Only the tribe's written waiver of immunity or the existence of a
tribal corporation as the contracting party will be required.
5. Apparently dissolution may only be accomplished by such Secretarial action. The
bill does not require notice and hearing before revocation, and it is doubtful that such
would be required by Section 5 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 1004
(1964). Similarly doubtful is availability of judicial review of such action under Section
10 of the A.P.A., 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1964).
6. Any sale or mortgage of tribal land must be authorized by the tribal constitution
or by a tribal referendum, unless the proceeds are invested "in accordance with an
approved land management plan". Investment of trust funds must be "in accordance
with an approved investment program."
7. The bill appears to contemplate that written waivers of immunity will usually be
limited to particular transactions, but the language permits general waivers which
would allow suit on torts or other causes of action unconnected with a particular contract or lease.
8. Title III also authorizes the governing body of any tribe to adopt "nondiscriminatory zoning, building, or other ordinances regulating the use and development of
Indian-owned lands within the territorial jurisdiction of the tribe and non-Indian
owned lands within the exterior boundaries of an Indian reservation if no state or
local zoning regulation is applicable thereto." Such tribal ordinances are "subject to
the approval of the Secretary," and he may also supercede such ordinances by rule or
regulation "whenever he concludes that such are necessary to conserve, protect, or
promote the interests of the Indians." Such ordinances should be governed by constitutional requirements of due process, equal protection, and so on.
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In addition to permitting normal judicial processes to govern
tribal agreements, use of tribal corporations in business dealings will
apparently simplify the process of establishing a business operation
on an Indian reservation. That process will normally begin with a
lease of tribal land for the plant or office site.' It may involve other
leases for mining,1 oil and gas exploration or production," timber 2
or other purposes.' 3 Such tribal agreements must be approved by the
governing body of the tribe or by subordinate authorities to which
the governing body has delegated the power to conclude such agreements.' 4 Under present laws such agreements must be approved by
the Secretary and must comply with applicable regulations." If an
approved agreement is inconsistent with such regulations, they will
be deemed waived where approval has been granted by the Secretary.'" Even in the simplest cases, the burden of reviewing tribal
9. 25 U.S.C. §415 (1964) authorizes leases of tribal lands for "business purposes"
subject to approval of the Secretary. Applicable regulations are contained in 25 C.F.R.
Part 131.
10. 25 U.S.C. § 396(a) (1964) authorizes mining leases of tribal lands subject to
Secretarial approval. The Secretary's regulations with respect thereto appear at 25
C.F.R. Part 171.
11. 25 U.S.C. § 398 (1964) authorizes oil and gas leases on tribal lands. General
regulations are at 25 C.F.R. Part 171; special regulations are at 25 C.F.R. Parts 183
and 184.
12. Timber leases are authorized by 25 U.S.C. §407 (1964) under regulations of
the Secretary, which appear at 25 C.F.R. Part 141.
13. 25 U.S.C. § 397 (1964) authorizes grazing leases. Farm leases are authorized
by 25 U.S.C. §402a (1964).
14. The Navajo Tribal Code, for instance, delegates to the Advisory Committee of
the Tribal Council authority to approve mining leases. T.18 N.T.C. § 1. Defects in
authorization of a lease may be unimportant if the tribe accepts the benefits of the
lease, thereby waiving the defects or becoming estopped to assert them. See Folk v. U.S.,
233 Fed. 177 (8th Cir. 1916), aff'd 260 U.S. 220 (1922), U.S. v. Forness, 37 F.Supp.
337 (W.D.N.Y. 1941), rev'd on other grounds, 125 F.2d 928 (2nd Cir. 1942), Continental Oil Co. v. Osage Oil & Refining Co., 57 F.2d 527 (10th Cir. 1932), Rollins &
Presbrey v. U.S., 23 Ct. Cl. 106 (1888), Peel v. Choctaw Nation, 45 Ct. Cl. 154 (1910).
Specific approval of a lease will impliedly waive any inconsistencies between its terms
and general ordinances of the tribe. Cf. Hallam v. Commerce Mining & Royalty Co., 32
F.2d 371 (N.D.Okla 1929), aff'd. 49 F.2d 103 (10th Cir. 1931).
15. The Secretary's power to approve leases may be delegated to his subordinate
officers by general orders (see U.S.C. § 1(a) (1964) and Interior Dep't Order No.
2508, § 28, authorizing the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to act for the Secretary
"under the general regulations") or by specific directions (see 25 U.S.C. §396(e)
(1964), authorizing approval by "superintendents or other officials in the Indian
Service").
16. By 25 C.F.R. § 1.2 the Secretary "retains the power to waive or make exceptions to his regulations . . . where permitted by law and the Secretary finds that such
waiver or exception is in the best interests of the Indians." The decided cases generally
uphold such power, at least where competing interests are not adversely affected.
Lytle v. Arkansas, 9 How. 314 (1850), Hallam v. Commerce Mining & Royalty Co.,
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laws and secretarial regulations is dull and technical. The bill
would apparently permit simplification of that process by transfer of the land to be affected by a lease to a tribal corporation,
which would conclude necessary agreements without reference to
the tribal council or the Secretary. Nevertheless, the bill specifically
provides that a tribe as such may not be empowered by secretarial
action under Title III to lease its proerty without specific secretarial
approval, and the Secretary might adopt similar restrictions in the
corporate charters issued under Title II.7
Adoption of the proposed Act should be a congressional signal to
the courts to review the judicial doctrines developed to carry out
congressional policies in Indian affairs. 8 Such doctrines are rooted
in the facts of the last century; they should be updated in accordance
with contemporary perspectives. In 1962, Mr. Justice Frankfurter
9 the great changes
noted in Organized Village of Kake v. Egan"
that have occurred since the days of Chief Justice Marshall:
The relation between the Indians and the States has by no means
remained constant since the days of John Marshall. In the early
years, as the white man pressed against Indians in the eastern part of
the continent, it was the policy of the United States to isolate the
tribes on territories of their own beyond the Mississippi, where they
were quite free to govern themselves. The 1828 treaty with the
supra note 14, Ingraham v. Ward, 56 Kan. 550, 44 P.14 (1896), Gage v. Gunther,
136 Cal. 1338, 68 P.710 (1902). The power to waive appears to derive from the Secretary's power to promulgate regulations under 5 U.S.C. § 485 (1964) and 25 U.S.C. § 2
(1964). Because the power to waive is discretionary it is doubtful that it can be delegated to subordinate officials, except by express direction. See Cudahy Packing Co. v.
Holland, 315 U.S. 357 (1942) ; United States v. Watashe, 102 F.2d 428 (10th Cir.
1939), 593 I.D. 358 (1947). But cf. Fleming v. Mohawk Wrecking & Lumber Co., 331
U.S. 111 (1947), 58 I.D. 499 (1943), 59 I.D. 555 (1947). The Lytle, Hallam, and
Ingraham cases, supra, recognize that approval by the Secretary of a lease impliedly
waives conflicting regulations. But cf. Boesche v. Udall, 373 U.S. 472 (1963) ; see also
Udall v. Littel, 366 F.2d 668 (D.C.Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1007 (1966). Approval by a subordinate officer will probably not carry that implication unless the
Secretary has expressly directed approval with a clear intention to waive such regulations. Failure to comply with applicable regulations, which were not effectively waived,
may be grounds for cancellation of the lease under such cases as Boesche and Littell,
supra; however, the Secretary's power to cancel a lease may be limited if the lessee
has made improvements in reliance on its validity. See Chapman v. El Paso Natural
Gas Co., 192 F.2d 404 (D.C.Cir. 1951).
17. Whether such approval would be subject to compliance with general regulations would seem to depend upon the provisions of the corporate charter.
18. In Winton v. Amos, 255 U.S. 373 (1920), the Court held that "Congress has
plenary authority over the Indians and all their tribal relations, and full power to
legislate concerning their tribal property." 255 U.S. 373, 391.
19. 369 U.S. 60 (1962).

APRIL

1968]

INDIAN INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT

Cherokee Nation, 7 Stat. 311, guaranteed the Indians their lands
would never be subjected to the jurisdiction of any State or Territory. Even the Federal Government itself asserted its power over
these reservations only to punish crimes committed by or against
non-Indians. I Stat. 469, 470; 2 Stat. 139. See U.S.C. § 1152.
As the United States spread westward, it became evident that there
was no place where the Indians could be forever isolated. In recognition of this fact the United States began to consider the Indians less
as foreign nations and more as a part of our country. In 1871 the
power to make treaties with Indian tribes was abolished, 16 Stat.
544, 566, 25 U.S.C. § 71. In 1887 Congress passed the General
Allotment Act, 24 Stat. 388, as amended, 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-358,
authorizing the division of reservation land among individual Indians with a view toward their eventual assimilation into our
society. In 1885, departing from the decision in Ex parte Crow Dog
(Ex parte Kang-gi-shun-ca) 109 U.S. 556, Congress intruded upon
reservation self-government to extend federal criminal law over
several specified crimes committed by one Indian against another on
Indian land, 23 Stat. 362, 385, as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 1153;
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375. Other offenses remained
matters for the tribe, United States v. Quiver, 241 U.S. 602.
The general notion drawn from Chief Justice Marshall's opinion
in Worcester v. Georgia (U.S.) 6 Pet. 515, 561; Kansas Indians,
(Blue Jacket v. Johnson County) (U.S.) 5 Wall. 737, 755-757;
and The New York Indians, (Fellows v. Denniston) (US) 5 Wall.
761, that an Indian reservation is a distinct nation within whose
boundaries state law cannot penetrate, has yielded to closer analysis
when confronted, in the course of subsequent developments, with
diverse concrete situations. By 1880 the Court no longer viewed
reservations as distinct nations. On the contrary, it was said that a
reservation was in many cases a part of the surrounding State or
Territory, and subject to its jurisdiction except as forbidden by
federal law, Utah & N.R.Co. v. Fisher, 116 U.S. 28, 31. In Langford v. Monteith, 102 U.S. 145, the Court held that process might
be served within a reservation for a suit in territorial court between
two non-Indians. In United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, and
Draperv. United States, 164 U.S. 240, the Court held that murder
of one non-Indian by another on a reservation was a matter for
state law.
The policy of assimilation was reversed abruptly in 1934. A great
many allottees of reservation lands had sold them and disposed of
the proceeds. Further allotments were prohibited in order to safeguard remaining Indian properties. The Secretary of the Interior
was authorized to create new reservations and to add lands to exist-
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ing ones. Tribes were permitted to become chartered federal corporations with powers to manage their affairs, and20 to organize and
adopt constitutions for their own self-government.
Chief among the outdated court-created doctrines is the theory
that tribal self-government is exercised on the basis of a primordial

right instead of congressional enactments. That doctrine of "residual
sovereignty" was given wide currency by Felix Cohen as "the most

basic principle of all Indian law."''z The doctrine has come to
permeate the judicial view of Indian tribes, particularly in those
cases where the courts have refused to intervene in disputes involving Indians. Although the factual basis for the doctrine was
20. 369 U.S. 60, 71-73. In addition to the landmarks noted by Justice Frankfurter,
the grant of U.S. citizenship to all Indians by the Act of June 2, 1924, 43 Stat. 253, 8
U.S.C. § 3, and the prohibition against changes in executive order reservations by the
Act of March 3, 1927, 44 Stat. 1347, 25 U.S.C. § 398(d) (1964), should be noted.
21. In Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe of the Pine Ridge Reservation, 231 F.2d 89
(8th Cir. 1956), the court quoted:
Felix S. Cohen's "Handbook of Federal Indian Law" states, at page 122:
"Section 2. The Derivation of Tribal Powjers.
"From the earliest years of the Republic the Indian tribes have been recognized as 'distinct, independent, political communities', (citing Worcester v.
[State of] Georgia [1832], 6 Pet. 515, 559 [31 U.S. 515, 559, 8 L.Ed.483], and
as such, qualified to exercise po'wers of self-government, not by virtue of any
delegation of powers from the Federal Government, but rather by reason of
their original tribal sovereignty. Thus treaties and statutes of Congress have
been looked up to by the courts as limitations upon original tribal powers, or
at most, evidences of recognition of such powers, rather than as the direct
source of tribal powers. This is but an application of the general principle
that 'It is only by positive enactments, even in the case of conquered and
subdued nations, that their laws are changed by the conqueror.'
In point of form, it is immaterial whether the powers of an Indian tribe
are expressed and exercised through customs handed down by word of mouth
or through written constitutions and statutes. In either case the laws of the
Indian tribe owe their force to the will of the members of the tribe." (Emphasis
supplied.)
"The whole course of judicial decision on the nature of Indian tribal powers
is marked by adherence to three fundamental principles: (1) An Indian tribe
possesses, in the first instance, all the powers of any sovereign state. (2) Conquest renders the tribe subject to the legislative power of the United States and,
in substance, terminates the external powers of sovereignty of the tribe, e.g.,
its power to enter into treaties with foreign nations, but does not by itself
affect the internal sovereignty of the tribe, i.e., its powers of local selfgovernment. (3) These powers are subject to qualification by treaties and by
express legislation of Congress, but, save as thus expressly qualified, full
powers of internal sovereignty are vested in the Indian tribes and in their
duly constituted organs of government." 231 F.2d 89, 92-93.
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originally sound, 22 history has changed the facts and the doctrine
should now be discarded. Judicial power should be withheld from
cases involving Indian tribes or individual Indians only because
intervention would violate a federal statute or some clearly defined
congressional policy. To withhold judicial remedies only because
Indian tribes at the beginning of the 19th Century were treated as
separate "nations" is to refuse justice without reason.
The courts should replace the doctrine of residual sovereignty
with a new doctrine based on Congress' present policies, beginning
with the Indian Reorganization Act of 193423 and continued in the
pending bill. Those policies require that the courts and the protections of the federal constitution be available to non-Indians who
enter into commercial relations with Indian tribes. The Indian Reorganization Act was not intended to recognize or confirm self24
government by the Indian tribes on the basis of a primordial right.
Congress realized that the Act was necessary because Indian gov22. In the beginning the Indian tribes were independent nations which made alliances with the French, the English, or the colonists as suited their purposes. Congress'
"plenary" authority over the tribes was necessary to prevent domestic perturbations
instigated by foreign powers treating with Indians. That phase ended in 1871 when
Congress discontinued treaty-making.
A possible legal basis for the doctrine of residual sovereignty was suggested in
Warren Trading Post Co. v. Moore, 95 Ariz. 110, 387 P.2d 809 (1964), where a
licensed Indian trader on the Navajo reservation argued that an Arizona sales tax
could not be applied to his gross receipts because the Commerce Clause created a
"free trade area" on Indian reservations analogous to the "free trade area" of interstate commerce. The argument was not considered by the Supreme Court, which invalidated the tax as conflicting with Congress' exclusive control over licensed traders.
Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965). The pending
bill will make that question moot by abolishing the trader system.
23. Act of June 18, 1934, 48 Stat. 984, 25 U.S.C. §§461-479 (1964), sometimes called
the Wheeler-Howard Act.
24. The Senate Committee Report, S.Rep. No. 1080, May 22, 1934, 73:2, described
the purpose of those portions of the bill as follows: "To stabilize the tribal organization
of Indian tribes by vesting such tribal organizations with real, though limited, authority
." and to "permit Indian tribes to equip themselves with the devices of modern
business organization, through forming themselves into business corporations." President Roosevelt wrote to Senator Wheeler on April 28, 1934, endorsing the bill: "We
can and should, without further delay, extend to the Indian the fundamental rights of
political liberty and local self-government ... that they require to attain a wholesome
American life." In the Senate debate, Senator Wheeler stated: ". . . this bill proposes to
give the Indians an opportunity to take control of their own resources and fit them as
American citizens." 78 Cong.Rec. 11124 (1934). Senator Ayers of Montana stated: "In
short, this is a provision to legalize the tribal councils of the various reservations of
the country if a majority of such tribe so desire." 78 Cong.Rec. 12164 (1934). The
entire discussion of the bill in both houses was in terms of granting new rights to
Indian tribes.
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ernment had "disintegrated" under prior federal policies and the
Indians needed an expression of Congress' confidence in their ability
to govern themselves. 5 In the Act Congress sought to create a new
system of tribal government. Upon acceptance of the Act, the tribe
could exercise limited rights of self-government under a tribal constitution approved by the Secretary and obtain "the devices of
modern business organization" by receiving from the Secretary a
tribal corporate charter. 6 Those charters became the foundation of
its government; primordial rights were thereby extinguished.
A new view of tribal self-government would hold that any tribal
claim to govern on the basis of primordial tribal right was extinguished by tribal acceptance of a charter under the Indian Reorganization Act. The constitutions and corporate charters issued under the
Act make it clear that no governmental powers may be exercised by
such tribes unless embodied in the constitution or corporate charter.2 7 A tribal government organized under the Act is a creation
of Congress. It derives its power from Congress and can exercise
25. Congressman Howard of Nebraska, sponsor of the bill on the House floor,
described the Indians as "Federal peons" because the Indians' "own native tribal
institutions have very largely disintegrated or been openly suppressed, and the entire
management of Indian affairs has been more and more concentrated in the hands of
the Federal Indian Service. The powers of this Bureau . . . have in the past been
unlimited. . . . Its formula for civilizing the Indians has always been the policy of
intolerance and suppression. . . . It destroyed his own political and civic institutions,
which he understood because he himself had created and used them for untold centuries. With the disintegration of his tribal and clan organizations, the Indian has
come to have less and less control of his own affairs until today he is a citizen in
name only, with neither power nor effective voice. Most existing tribal councils are
permitted purely by sufferance, not through any legal, guaranteed right. In most of his
actions the Indian must today take his orders from a Federal bureau, and against
these orders he has no legal appeal. He may petition, he may complain; but he has
no legal defense against this bureaucratic power." 78 Cong.Rec. 11729 (1934). The
bill's creation of structures for tribal self-government would have, he noted, "psychological and moral effects . . . and it will set the entire Indian population in motion to
take the initiative for their own salvation and to cooperate intelligently with the
Government." 78 Cong.Rec. 11731 (1934).
26. Section 18 of the Act, 25 U.S.C. §478 (1964), provided that the Act would not
apply to any "reservation' where a majority of adult Indians shall vote against its
application. Probably the most important tribe to reject the Act was the Navajos, who
voted 7,992 to 7,608 against it. R. Young, The Navajo Yearbook 377 (1961). If the
Act was accepted, the tribe could adopt a constitution under § 16, 25 U.S.C. § 476
(1964), and/or establish a tribal corporation under § 17, 25 U.S.C. §477 (1964).
27. The tribal constitutions typically provide that "inherent powers" or "rights and
powers heretofore vested" in the tribe and not specifically mentioned in the Article
defining powers of the tribal council may be exercised by the people only through
amendment of the constitution. All amendments require approval of the Secretary.
Thus, any residual powers of primordial sovereignty are expressly made subject to
the written constitution.
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only such powers as Congress (through the Secretary) has provided. 8 Such a tribe is truly a "federal municipal corporation" to
which the Constitution should be applicable. 29 Extinguishment of
Indian claims by consent of the tribe is well established doctrine in
the case of primordial occupancy of land. Tribal acceptance of a
reservation created by treaty, statute, or executive order is regularly
held to extinguish "Indian title" based on primordial possession.8
In the same fashion, tribal acceptance of a governmental structure
and governmental powers created by Congress should be held to
28. Solicitor Margold, in Opinion M-27781, October 25, 1935, 55 I.D. 14 (1934),
defined nine powers of Indian tribes under "existing law": (1) power to form a
government, (2) power to "define conditions of membership", (3) regulation of domestic relations of tribal members, (4) rules of inheritance, (5) levy of taxes and fees, (6)
exclusion of non-members from the reservation, (7) power to regulate the use of
property, (8) administration of justice, and (9) regulation of Federal employees. The
tribal constitutions issued under the Act typically prevent exercise of any of those
powers without approval of the Secretary, except in some cases control over domestic
relations and inheritance of tribal property. The formation of a government is limited
by Sections 16 and 17 of the Act; tribal membership rules are approved by the
Secretary and may not be modified without his consent; taxes may not be imposed
(particularly on non-members doing business on the reservation) without Secretarial
approval; exclusions are controlled by federal authorities; use of property under
tribal jurisdiction is governed by Secretarial review; tribal courts can only be established or their jurisdiction changed with Secretarial approval; inheritance of allotted
land is governed wholly by federal statutes; control of federal employees can only be
exercised to the extent power has been delegated to the tribe by the Secretary. If there
are residual sovereign powers, what are they? Sol.Op. M-36119, 61 I.D. 8 (1952),
takes the position that a tribe chartered under § 16 of the Act possesses "only the
powers mentioned" in that section.
29. The 1958 revision of Felix Cohen's Handbook, see note 21 supra, prefaces the
excerpt quoted in Iron Crow, supra note 21, with the sentence: "Tribal powers of selfgovernment are now considered to be municipal in character." Solicitor, Dep't of
Interior, Federal Indian Law 396 (1958), hereinafter cited as Federal Indian Law.
In various cases Indian tribes have been treated as "instrumentalities" of the United
States. Federal Indian Law 472-473, 846-848. Sol.Op. M-27810 (Dec. 13, 1934), cited at
Federal Indian Law 473, states: "The granting of a Federal corporate charter to an
Indian tribe confirms the character of such a tribe as a Federal instrumentality and
agency." See also Sol. Op. M-29156 (June 30, 1937). At best, a tribe chartered under
the Act is only analogous to a municipal corporation; it exercises only such powers as
have been granted to it under its charter, and, in most cases, such powers must be
exercised with specific Secretarial approval. The ordinary municipal corporation has far
more freedom of action than a tribal council under its constitution.
30. Indian title to land may be extinguished by conquest, Act of Congress, or
agreement. See United States v. Santa Fe Pacific R.R., 314 U.S. 339 (1941), Tee-HitTon Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955). Although the Court stated in the
Santa Fe case that "an extinguishment cannot be lightly implied", 314 U.S. 339, 354,
creation of a reservation to which only a few of the Walapai tribe moved was nevertheless "deemed to have been a relinquishment of tribal rights in lands outside the
reservation". 314 U.S. 339, 358. The Court also noted that the "manner, method and
time of such extinguishment raise political, not justiciable, issues." 314 U.S. 339, 347.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[VOL. 8

extinguish the "residual sovereignty" of a tribe based upon primordial practice."
Similarly, a tribe whose government was created by the Secretary
without regard to the Indian Reorganization Act should be treated
as a creature of Congress rather than as a "nation" established by
32
primordial right. The most important such tribe is the Navajos,
31. Extinguishment of tribal government by primordial right is not the same as
termination of tribal existence. Issuance of charters under the Indian Reorganization
Act served to preserve the existence of tribes; only their possible claim to govern themselves as a matter of primordial right was extinguished.
32. Historically, the Navajos had no "government". W. Hill, Some Aspects of
Navajo Political Structure, 13 Plateau No. 2 (1939), describes traditional Navajo
patterns of political power as follows:
Speaking in strictly political sense, a Navaho tribe does not exist. Such cohesiveness
as occurs in a national sense is due to a common linguistic and cultural heritage, to the
occupation of a defined territory, and to a common designation for themselves dini
'people' as against all others. The Navaho have never functioned as a unit in a concerted action. Never have all of them been brought, even temporarily, under the leadership of a single or individual group for a common purpose.
The fundamental political entity of the Navaho is the natural community. This unit
is an economic one, geographically determined and distinct ...
These natural communities were economically self-sufficient. Their problems were
locally their own. They acted without reference to other such units, and often to the
detriment of the others ...
* 0 *
Community leadership was vested in one or more individuals whose duties involved
the direction of domestic affairs and warfare. The Navaho recognized a distinct
dichotomy of interst in these two cultural phases and seldom did one man fill both
offices. The choice of the war leader (war natani) or leaders was entirely dependent
upon ritual attainment. ...
The Navaho attitude toward these war leaders was equivocal. While they respected
them they were also criticized, and were generally accredited with responsibility for
the attack and subsequent subjugation of the Navaho by the United States Government. ...
Unlike the war leader, the local headman or peace natani was chosen. Factors
governing the choice included exemplary character, oratorical ability, personal magnetism, and proven ability to serve in both the practical and religious aspects of the
culture .
Tenure of office was assumed to be for life. Normally, however, headmen resigned
when advanced age prevented them from adequately coping with the amount of work
and responsibility which the office entailed. In this case they customarily recommended a
successor. . ..
The obligations and duties of the headman were manifold, and, as he had no coercive
power, his success and efficiency depend entirely upon his personal qualities and
abilities. He was expected to address his own and other communities as public and
ceremonial gatherings. While these talks might refer to specific problems, they were
usually ethical and moral in their scope, admonishing the people to live in peace,
righteousness, and to be diligent and hard working. As most headmen were accom-
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who have so assimilated the Secretary's government that it has beplished raconteurs, various traditional and mythological tales were used to emphasize
the points.
The natani acted as general economic director and encouraged productive activities.
He planned in advance the work for the Community, set the time for planting, and
superintended planting, cultivation, and harvesting. He instructed in the proper techniques of agriculture and pastoralism. Any communal work was under his supervision.
In the legal sphere he arbitrated disputes over damages, acted as mediator in
quarrels between individuals, remonstrated with wrong-doers, and adjusted family
difficulties. Family difficulties most frequently involved marital disputes and desertion.
Indigent individuals without relatives were considered his responsibility and a headman's menage usually included a number of such dependents. He was the diplomatic
representative between his own and other communities, tribes, and governments. He
was expected to dispense hospitality to visitors.
Generally two or three men acted as assistants and advisors to the headman and
were appointed by him. They were detailed to various duties in his absence. No
recognized tribal or community council existed, though individual expression was encouraged at any public gathering.
In summary: no centralized authority existed among the Navaho. The political unit
was the natural community, environmentally defined. Over this was a non-hereditary
elective headman, whose influence permeated every sphere of the culture except warfare, which was usually in the hands of a separate religious leader. This headman
had no coercive power and his efficacy and tenure depended entirely upon personal
qualities and practical abilities.
Similarly, Shepardson, Navajo Ways in Government, MEMOIR 96, 65 AMERICAN
ANTHROPOLOGICAL ASS'N No. 3, Pt. 2 (1963):
. . . The Navajo tribe, as it existed before the Conquest, had no centralized authority.
It never convened as a group, but it was distinctly bounded by the limits of acceptance
of a common culture, that is, a system of shared customs, beliefs, and values that was
considered binding on the society. A common language delimited the tribe. Sections of
the tribe controlled and defended a common territory. A network of kinship and
affinal relations, widely dispersed as the result of clan exogamy, and a common ceremonial system served to integrate the society and give a sense of distinctiveness to the
Dini or People. Navajos neither raided nor made war upon each other, but they
intermittently raided and made war upon all other nearby groups, Indian and white.
The tribe represented the ultimate bounds of legitimacy or sovereignty, since no nonNavajo person or group was recognized to exert control over the members of the
tribe.
Navajo authority was ultimately validated by the myths and by an appeal to Old
Navajo ways. Transgression of taboos and deviance from the accepted ways, it was
believed, resulted in disharmony and illness. Navajo authority was personal, personally defined in particular situations, a Navajo owed loyalty to persons rather than
to the community or the tribe as an abstract idea. ...
See also Van Valkenburgh, Navajo Common Law, 9 MUSEUM NOTES No. 4
(Museum of Northern Arizona, Flagstaff, Arizona 1936); Haile, PROPERTY CONCEPTS OF THE NAVAJO INDIANS (1954).
The tribe rejected the Indian Reorganization Act. See note 24 supra. The NavajoHopi Rehabilitation Act permits the tribe to adopt a constitution by majority vote of
the adult members without time limit. 25 U.S.C. § 636 (1964). Failure to adopt a
constitution leaves in operation the government created by the Secretary, which the
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come their own.8" The Navajo Tribal Council acts on substantive
matters only with the approval of the Secretary.8 4 Such continuing
federal power is inconsistent with any claim that tribal government is
based upon a primordial sovereignity. Indeed, in any case where
tribal action is validly taken only after Secretarial approval, that
action is federal action; the protections of the United States Constitution should not be withheld from such action on the theory that
the ground of its validity is some original tribal sovereignty.
A doctrine predicating extinguishment of tribal sovereignty by
primordial right upon a charter under the Indian Reorganization
Act or an administrative requirement of secretarial approval of
tribal ordinances will clarify much muddled judicial thinking about
Indian tribes but will clearly affect actual decisions only in one area :
the United States Constitution will become applicable as a restraint
upon tribal powers. The leading cases which proscribed judicial intervention in cases involving Indians can be explained on other
grounds.
One of those leading cases, United States v. United States Fidelity
& Guaranty Co.,88 explained its denial of judicial intervention on
the basis of "sovereign immunity." In that case, the Supreme Court
held void a money judgment recovered by the lessee of a coal mining
lease with the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations by way of counterclaim in an earlier proceeding for reorganization of the lessee. The
judgment was raised as a defense to the government's later suit
against the bonding company and the lessee's trustee intervened to
seek payment thereof. The court noted that counterclaims against
the United States were authorized by the Act of April 26, 1906,36
which made final dispositions of the affairs of the Five Civilized
Tribes, only in the United States courts in the Indian Territory; in
the Missouri forum chosen by the government, it was immune from
Commissioner of Indian Affairs described, in a memorandum dated March 23, 1937,
as follows: ". . . the Council, existing or reorganized, is an institution created by the
Secretary. Its authorities are derived from regulations." Young, supra note 26, at 380
33. R. Young, supra note 26, at 386; Shepardson, supra note 32, 85-92; Sasaki,
Fruitland, New Mexico 107-125 (1960).
34. Secretarial approval of Tribal Council resolutions has been a uniform administrative requirement. Secretarial approval apparently originated in Section 29 of the
Curtis Act of June 28, 1898, 30 Stat. 495, 512, under which the President was given the
right to approve resolutions of the Five Civilized Tribes. Without such approval, a
resolution had no "validity". Cf. Oliver v. Udall, 306 F2d 819 (D.C. Civ. 1962), discussed at note 72 infra.
35. 309 U.S. 506 (1940).
36. 34 Stat. 137 (1906).
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suit or counterclaim. However, the Court did recognize the validity, under the doctrine of equitable recoupment, of the lessee's set-off
against the Nations' claims against the lessee for unpaid royalties.
Justice Reed explained the Court's decision thus:
These Indian Nations are exempt from suit without congressional
authorization. It is as though the immunity which was theirs as
to the United States for their benefit, as their tribal
sovereigns passed
7
properties did.3

That explanation is the most unnecessary dictum. The ground for
the Court's decision was that the United States was acting on behalf
of the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations following dissolution of the

tribal governments,88 and that the Court had no jurisdiction to
entertain the claim against the United States. 9 By treating the
tribal governments as dissolved the Court should have avoided any

reference to tribal immunity from suit.
Enactment of the pending bill will eliminate "sovereign immunity" as a bar to judicial intervention in disputes with Indian tribes
where the requisite waiver has been obtained. Suits against tribal
corporations formed under the bill should be possible, as they have
been against corporations formed under section 17 of the Indian
Reorganization Act.40 Nevertheless, tribal property will be exempt
37. 309 U.S. 506, 512.
38. See Federal Indian Law 996-999.
39. The Court cited U.S. v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495 (1940), decided the same day, for
the proposition that "cross-claims against the United States are justiciable only in those
courts where Congress has consented to their presentation." The Missouri court in
which the reorganization proceedings were pending did not have jurisdiction of the
cross-claim.
40. In Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe, 374 P.2d 691 (Colo. 1962), Mrs. Martinez
sued to established her status as a member of the tribe and for damages caused by her
exclusion from the reservation. An earlier action in Federal court had been dismissed
for want of a Federal question. 249 F.2d 915 (10th Cir. 1958), cert. denied 356 U.S.
960 (1958). The Tribe had been incorporated under the Indian Reorganization Act;
its charter provided power:
(h) To sue and be sued in courts of competent jurisdiction within the
United States; but the grant or exercise of such power to sue and to be
sued shall not be deemed a consent by the said Tribe or by the United States
to the levy of any judgment, lien or attachment upon the property of the
Tribe other than income or chattels specially pledged or assigned.
The Court reversed the trial court's dismissal of the complaint, stating:
The defendant by adopting incorporation under 25 U.S.C.A. § 476 (1964)
and consenting to sue and be sued in courts of competent jurisdiction within the
United States, has rendered itself amenable to the courts of the State of
Colorado in any action of which the state courts may take cognizance. It
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from execution unless it has been "hypothecated to performance of
the contract sued upon. ' 41 That limitation should not be a problem
where forethought has provided the requisite security interest.
To the extent that Justice Reed's opinion rested on the doctrine
of residual sovereignty, it should no longer be followed. His reliance
on that doctrine is a source of confusion in the opinion. He stated
that tribal immunity from suit is based upon "the immunity which
was theirs as sovereigns." But he did not describe the extent of such
immunity. Historically, there may well have been difficulties in enforcing a judicial writ against Indian tribes ;42 however, such difficulties surely did not exist in 1936. Analytically, the immunity of
sovereigns has never been absolute. 3 If tribal sovereignty is analogous to that of the United States, the states or the English
Crown, suit would be possible against a tribal officer.44 If, as seems
has recourse to the state courts for the protection of its own rights and is
answerable in said courts to those who assert claims against it.
The case of Whyte v. District Court, 140 Colo. 334, 346 P.2d 1012, is clearly
distinguishable from the present case. There the parties were enrolled members of the Ute Mountain Tribe, were domiciled on the reservation and involved in a domestic controversy over which the tribal courts had exclusive
jurisdiction. Here there is no showing of the existence of any court or tribunal
to which the plaintiff may turn if the courts of Colorado reject her petition.
We are here concerned only with the question of whether a corporation, even
though its membership be limited to reservation Indians, may wrongfully
deny one of its members the right to participate in the enjoyment of property
which it holds for the use and benefit of all its members. For the purposes
of the motion to dismiss we must accept as admitted all of the material
allegations of the amended complaint, and so far as appears therefrom the
trial court had jurisdiction of the controversy and erred in dismissing the
action. 374 P.2d 691 or 694.
41. In the Maryland Casualty case, 361 F.2d 517 (5th Cir. 1966), a similar restriction was involved. The bonding company there argued unsuccessfully that the restriction should not apply where the judgment arose from a commercial transaction.
The court's decision seems entirely proper; where Federal policy safeguards tribal
property from attack, that policy should be enforced regardless of the character of
the transaction. The policy contemplates that tribal property will be reached only
where the tribe has agreed that it shall be reached; the person who does business with
the tribe must protect his interest by making the necessary agreement in advance.
42. Apparently no judicial decision has recognized the physical difficulty, or impossibility, of executing the court's process in Indian country as a basis for disclaiming
jurisdiction. Nevertheless, such difficulties existed until the end of the 19th Century;
they surely played an important part in determining the judicial policies of the time.
43. L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 204-231 (1965).
44. Osborn v. The Bank, 9 Wheat. 738 (1824), Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall. 203
(1873), Board of Liquidators v. McComb, 92 U.S. 531 (1876), McGahey v. Virginia,
135 U.S. 662 (1890), Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U.S. 1 (1891), Ex Parte Young,
209 U.S. 123 (1908), Goltra v. Weeks, 271 U.S. 536 (1926), Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S.
731 (1947).
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more reasonable, the sovereignty of Indian tribes is analogous to
foreign nations45 or municipal corporations,4" suit would be entertained to enforce an agreement involving a commercial or proprietary matter. 7
The authorities cited by Justice Reed indicate that his holding was
based upon an assumed congressional policy to exclude the courts
from interference in, at least, the affairs of the Five Civilized
Tribes. The Court supported its decision by Thebo v. Choctaw
Tribe of Indians, 4s Adams v. Murphy,49 and Turner v. U.S.50 Both
Thebo and Adams denied tribal attorneys recovery of money judgments for unpaid fees under contracts of employment. Thebo
declared it would be "presumptuous" for a court to assume jurisdiction over a cause of action against the Choctaw Tribe in the absence
of a congressional grant of jurisdiction, even if the tribe consented.
Adams applied the same rule in an action against the "principal
chief" of the Creek Nation. Turner permitted suit under an authorizing statute against the Creek Nation for depredation by bands of
individual Indians but denied recovery on the ground that Congress
had not determined that the Nation should be responsible for acts
of its members.5 ' The Court also relied upon the legislation terminating the Five Civilized Tribes, in which the right to sue the tribes
was narrowly circumscribed.52
45. ". . . [I]t has long been the view of the Department of State that agencies of
foreign governments engaged in ordinary commercial transactions in the United States
enjoy no privileges or immunities not appertaining to other foreign corporations. .. ."
2 G. Hackworth, Digest of International Law 481 (1941). Lyders v. Land, 32 F.2d
308 (N.D. Cal. 1929), Royal Italian Government v. National Brass & Copper Tube
Co., 294 Fed 23 (2nd Cir. 1923), Kunglig Jarnvogsstyrelsen v. Dexter & Carpenter,
Inc., 32 F.2d 195 (2nd Cir. 1929), Dexter & Carpenter Inc. v. Kunglig Jarnvogsstyrelsen, 43 F.2d 705 (2nd Cir. 1930), Hannes v. Kingdom of Roumania Monopolies Inst., 6
N.Y.S.2d 960 (1938).
46. Municipal corporations may be sued on business matters not involving "governmental" powers. 17 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 49.02 (3rd Ed. 1949), 18 McQuillin, § 53.23. A lease of city land, vacant and not devoted to public use, would be
treated as a "proprietary" lease on which the municipality would be liable to suit.
Pablix Asbury Corp. v. Asbury Park, 18 N.J. Super. 286, 86 A.2d 798 (1951),
Wa-Wa-Yanda, Inc. v. Dickerson, 239 N.Y.S. 2d 473 (1963), 10 McQuillin, supra § 28.42.
47. This was the bonding company's theory in Maryland Casualty, see note 41
srupra.
48. 66 Fed. 372 (8th Cir. 1895).
49. 165 Fed. 304 (8th Cir. 1908).
50. 248 U.S. 354 (1919).
51. Turner claimed to be entitled to recover from the Tribe for damage to 80
miles of fence by three bands of Creek Indians.
52. Section 2 of the Act of June 28, 1898, 30 Stat. 495, permitted a tribe to be joined
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To the extent that Justice Reed relied upon congressional policies
regarding the peculiar problems of the Five Civilized Tribes, his
result should be modified, in a case arising at the present time, to
reflect Congress' present policies in the Indian Reorganization Act
of 1934 or the proposed Indian Resources Development Act. The
integration of Indian tribes into the mainstream of national commerce and the industrial development of Indian reservations, which
now appears to be the prime congressional objective, requires that
the courts be available to construe and enforce tribal leases and
agreements.
In other cases courts have refused judicial intervention in controversies involving Indian tribes on the theory that such intervention destroys tribal self-government. In Williams v. Lee 53 the
Court held that the Arizona courts did not have jurisdiction over an
action by a licensed reservation trader against an individual Navajo
to collect a past due account. No federal question was presented by
the facts; the issue was solely whether state or tribal courts had
jurisdiction. 4 The decision rested on three significant grounds: ( 1)
the Navajo Tribal Court asserted jurisdiction; 55 (2) Congress
failed to provide concurrent federal, state, and tribal court jurisdiction in the Navajo-Hopi Rehabilitation Act5 after President Truman vetoed an earlier version which had created such concurrent
jurisdiction on the Navajo Reservation; 57 and (3) Arizona refused
to accept jurisdiction over the reservation after passage of the Act
of August 15, 1953.58
in any civil action in the United States Court for the Indian Territory in which the
tribe's property was "affected by the issues being heard'; after joinder "suit shall
thereafter be conducted and determined as if said tribe had been an original party
to said action." Section 18 of the Act of April 26, 1906, 34 Stat. 137, 144, permitted
defendants in any action instituted by the Secretary for recovery of tribal property
"to set up and have adjudicated any claim it may have against such tribe". No Act
authorized actions against tribes directly.
53. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
54. See Williams v. Lee, 83 Ariz. 241, 319 P.2d 998 (1958). The Arizona court
upheld state jurisdiction but vacated a levy upon defendant's sheep.
55. T.7 N.T.C. § 63 (b).
56. 64 Star. 46 (1950), 25 U.S.C. § 636 (1964).
57. S.1407, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.
58. Section 7 of the Act of August 15, 1953, 67 Stat. 588, 28 U.S.C. § 1360 note.
Section 7 was repealed by Title IV of P.L. 90-284, infra note 101, which grants
federal consent to state assumption of civil or criminal jurisdiction over Indian lands
subject to acceptance of such jurisdiction by a majority vote of the adult Indians
affected thereby.
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However, Justice Black's opinion appeared to place reliance on
the theory of residual sovereignty. He referred to the fact that
originally "the Indian tribes were separate nations," he cited the
particular history of the Cherokees in their conflict with the State
of Georgia in the 1830's, and he concluded that "absent governing
Acts of Congress, the question has always been whether the state
action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their
own laws and be ruled by them." However, the "right of selfgovernment" was not a determining factor in reaching his decision.
He relied on clear actions of Congress (if not on its "Acts") which
defined the policies he found decisive. Moreover, "governing Acts
of Congress" are never "absent" in the broad sense that a court can
usually find a basis in the history of Congress' dealings with a particular tribe to decide whether Congress intended the jurisdiction of
its tribal court to be exclusive. It is there that the court's attention
should be focused; not on some mythical primordial government. If
the court ignores the relevant facts of tribal history, it may reach
the absurd conclusion that all Indian tribes are like the Cherokees.
Thus, Justice Black was forced to note that the Navajos were like
"other Indians" when in fact they are probably unique. 9
Justice Black's final conclusion, "that to allow the exercise of state
jurisdiction here would undermine the authority of the tribal courts
over Reservation affairs and hence would infringe on the right of
the Indians to govern themselves," 60 was surely correct. The basic
policy was protection of the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribal court;
that was the only element of tribal self-government involved in the
case. To infringe that jurisdiction would contravene the clear
policies of Congress; protection of a more generalized "self-government" was not involved.
Historically, Congress has been careful to protect the exclusive
jurisdiction of tribal courts over tribal members. That protection is
especially clear from Congress' treatment of the courts of the Five
Civilized Tribes. In a footnote Justice Black alluded to the history
of the Five Civilized Tribes in Oklahoma, but he did not point to
the fact that the Act of May 2, 1890,1 confirmed the exclusive
jurisdiction of their tribal courts while conferring on the United
States courts in the Indian Territory civil jurisdiction over disputes
59. 358 U.S. 217, 221. See note 32 supra.
60. 358 U.S. 217, 223.
61. 26 Stat. 81 (1890).
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outside tribal court jurisdiction. When the United States courts were

62
given general jurisdiction, the tribal courts were abolished.
Justice Black's apparent reliance on the doctrine of residual
sovereignty has led other courts to give the decision a broad interpretation. In several cases courts have refused jurisdiction on the
ground that judicial intervention would interfere with tribal selfgovernment or "reservation affairs" without regard to tribal court
jurisdiction. But in each case the tribal court had jurisdiction, and
such decisions can be explained on the narrow interpretation of
Williams v. Lee.
In Littell v. Nakai 3 the general counsel of the Navajo Tribe sued
the Tribal Chairman as an individual to enjoin tortious interference
with his employment contract. The court dismissed the action on the
grounds that the courts lacked jurisdiction over any matter "demanding the exercise of the Tribe's responsibility for self government."'64 That decision was correct, but the court's dictum is erroneous. The case was justiciable in the tribal court because Nakai
was not sued in his official capacity, nor was the tribe a party.65
Williams v. Lee clearly applied; therefore, diversity jurisdiction was
62. The Act of June 7, 1897, 30 Stat. 62, gave the United States courts in the
Indian Territory exclusive jurisdiction over "all civil causes in law or equity . . . by
any person in said Territory" after January 1, 1898. The Act of June 28, 1898, 30
Stat. 495, abolished the tribal courts as of July 1, 1898, and provided for the transfer
of pending cases to the United States courts for the Indian Territory. The laws of the
Indian tribes "shall not thereafter be enforced". Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1360.
63. 344 F.2d 486 (9tth Cir. 1965).
64. Id. at 490.
65. The jurisdiction of the Navajo Tribal Court is limited to (1) violations of the
Law and Order Code, (2) civil actions in which an Indian is defendant, (3) domestic
relations and decedents' estates of Indians, and (4) other matters within the jurisdiction of the former Navajo Court of Indian offenses or placed within its jurisdiction
by the Tribal Council. T.7 N.T.C. § 63. The Court also has jurisdiction of any
action in which the Navajo Tribe is plaintiff. T.7 N.T.C. § 383. There is no jurisdiction over actions in which the Tribe or a Tribal officer is defendant.
Under T.7 N.T.C. § 34 the Tribal Court applies the following law:
(a) In all civil cases the Court of the Navajo Tribe shall apply any laws of
the United States that may be applicable, any authorized regulations of the
Interior Department, and any ordinances or customs of the Tribe, not prohibited by such Federal laws.
(b) Where any doubt arises as to the customs and usages of the Tribe the
court may request the advice of counsellors familiar with these customs and
usages.
(c) Any matters that are not covered by the traditional customs and usages
of the Tribe, or by applicable Federal laws and regulations, shall be decided
by the Court of the Navajo Tribe according to the laws of the state in which
the matter in dispute may lie.
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blocked by Woods v. Interstate Reality Co.66 No federal question
was presented by the complaint. 6 7 However, the court's dictum implies that any dispute with a tribe or a tribal official will not be
justiciable in the state or federal courts because such a dispute potentially involves tribal self-government. Under that view tribal
failure to assert jurisdiction would be irrelevant if the tribe could
have asserted jurisdiction.
A similarly broad view of Williams v. Lee was taken in United
States ex rel. Rollingson v. Blackfeet Tribal Court,6 8 where the
court interpreted the doctrine of Williams v. Lee as applying to
all "disputes over property and property rights." In that case, the
court denied a writ of prohibition against the tribal court restraining it from enforcing a judgment against non-Indians accused of
committing a crime on the Blackfeet Reservation. The petitioners
were stockholders and employees of a Montana corporation which
held a 2 5 -year lease with the Blackfeet Tribe. They were accused of
committing an unspecified crime against the property of a member of
the Blackfeet Tribe. The tribal court served upon one of the
petitioners an order, addressed to both petitioners and to the corporation, to show cause why they should not be "forceably ejected"
from the reservation and ordering that "said defendants" be perpetually restrained from entering the reservation if they failed to
appear. Upon a special appearance in the Tribal Court, the court
entered oral judgment against the defendant served and directed
him to leave the Reservation within 10 days. The court's denial of
the writ was properly based upon absence of complete diversity of
citizenship, failure to allege the requisite jurisdictional amount, and
the absence of a federal question. The court's interpretation of
Williams was unnecessary (and erroneous) dicta.
In Hot Oil Service, Inc. v. Hall6 9 the court construed Williams
v. Lee to bar a suit involving "Reservation affairs." There a New
Mexico corporation sued in Arizona to collect damages for unpaid
rent and the value of goods furnished to the defendant, a Navajo
woman who was sued in her individual capacity and as administrator
of her non-Indian husband's estate. Defendant had leased the land
66. 337 U.S. 535 (1949).
67. Littell argued that Federal approval of his contract made its protection a
Federal question. The court properly rejected the argument because no construction
of the Federal statute requiring such approval was required by the allegations.
68. 244 F. Supp. 474 (D. Mont. 1965).
69. 366 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1966).
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from the Navajo Tribe and had then subleased it to the plaintiff,
which had built a gas station and leased it back to her. Since the
case was justiciable before the tribal court (indeed, a separate action
was proceeding in that court at the time of the appeal), the narrow
basis for Williams v. Lee was present, and the court's broad interpretation of that decision was unnecessary. Interestingly, the court
assumed it would have had jurisdiction had defendant been sued
solely in her capacity as administratrix. 70 Apparently such diversity
jurisdiction would not be defeated by the fact that "Reservation
affairs" would be indirectly involved.
It is not clear what effect enactment of the pending bill will have
on the doctrine of Williams v. Lee. The grant of federal court jurisdiction covering actions against tribes which have waived immunity
or against tribal corporations does not necessarily mean that
Congress intended thereby to divest tribal courts of exclusive jurisdiction in cases involving members of the tribe. Tribal courts do
not typically possess jurisdiction over suits to which the pending bill
will be applicable; therefore, the bill's enactment will probably have
no effect on tribal courts or on the applicability of Williams v. Lee.
The doctrine of residual sovereignty has been most harmful in
cases dealing with applicability of the United States Constituton to
tribal actions. Most of the decided cases involved actions against
members of the tribe. Thus, in Native American Church v. Navajo
Tribal Council,71 the court affirmed dismissal of a complaint challenging the constitutionality of a tribal ordinance prohibiting use or
possession of peyote, a drug used by plaintiff church in its religious
ceremonies, 7 2 on grounds that it violated the first amendment. Other
claims based upon violations of the fourth and fifth amendments
were not considered.73 The court reasoned that the first amendment
applies only to the federal government or, by virtue of the fourteenth amendment, to the states. Indian tribes, not being states, are
70. The administratrix' residence in Arizona would control. Suit against the
decedent's estate would not have been justiciable in the tribal court.
71. 272 F.2d 131 (10th Cir. 1959).
72. See S. Aberle, The Peyote Religion Among The Navaho (1966). The Secretary's
approval of the same tribal ordinance later attacked on First Amendment grounds in
Oliver v. Udall, 306 F2d. 819 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied 372 U.S. 908 (1963). The
court upheld dismissal of the complaint because only an "abstract question" was presented. The court stated: "The Secretary has done no more than approve action which
the Navajo Tribe was entitled to take," citing the Native American Church case.
73. Individual plaintiffs sought damages for illegal search and seizure, denial of
right to counsel, and denial of a jury trial. Another issue raised but not decided was
the Tribe's claim of sovereign immunity from suit.
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not subject to the Constitution save "where it expressly binds them, or
is made binding by treaty or some act of Congress." 74
The applicability of constitutional protections to the private
rights of non-Indians, where action of an Indian tribe is alleged to
have infringed such rights, becomes a matter of great importance as
commercial and industrial relations between Indian tribes and business corporations multiply. For instance, the plaintiffs in the Blackfeet case 75 alleged that the tribal court's order would deprive the
corporation of its lease (by excluding its agents or employees from
enjoying the leased premises) and thus take its property without
due process of law. The federal question had not been properly
raised because the plaintiff relied on the fourteenth amendment
rather than the fifth; however, the court's opinion may imply that
presentation of a constitutional question would not support federal
court jurisdiction because the Constitution does not apply to tribal
courts.7 6

The constitutional question was presented squarely in Barta v.
Oglala Sioux Tribe of Pine Ridge Reservation,77 where a tribal tax
on non-Indian lessees of tribal land was alleged to violate the

United States Constitution on unspecified grounds. 7 8 The court in-

dicated the tax would be constitutional on the basis of Morris v.
Hitchcock,7 but held that "the Fifth Amendment [may not] be
invoked as against any legislative action of the Indian tribes,"
80
citing Talton v. Mayes.

Talton v. Mayes was a petition for habeas corpus by a Cherokee
Indian convicted by the tribal court of murdering another Cherokee.
The petition claimed that the petitioner had been indicted by a
grand jury of five persons contrary to the indictment clause of the
fifth amendment. An 1835 treaty81 guaranteed to the Cherokee
Nation the right "to make and carry into effect all such laws as they
74. 272 F.2d 131, 135.
75. 244 F. Supp. 474 (D. Mont. 1965).
76. "I find nothing in the Colliflower decision which would affect the right of the
tribal court to hear substantive questions within its jurisdiction." Id. at 478. The court
also suggested that the tribal court "should follow the requirements of due process not
only in this case, but in all matters within its jurisdiction."
77. 259 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1958).
78. The power of the tribe to levy the tax had previously been upheld in Iron
Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe of Pine Ridge Reservation, 231 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1956),
on the authority of Buster v. Wright, 135 Fed. 947 (8th Cir. 1905).
79. 194 U.S. 385 (1904). The decision upheld a similar tax imposed by the
Chickasaw Nation.
80. 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
81. 7 Stat. 478, 481 (1835).
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may deem necessary for the government and protection of the persons and property within their own country belonging to their people
or such persons as have connected themselves with them: provided
always that they shall not be inconsistent with the constitution of the
United States" and acts of Congress. A treaty in 186682 guaranteed
that "the judicial tribunals of the nation . . . [shall] retain exclusive jurisdiction in all civil and criminal causes arising within their
country in which members of the nation . . . shall be the only
parties." The Act of May 2, 1890, s3 confirmed the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribal courts in such cases and provided that the "Constitution of the United States and all general laws . . . shall have
the same force and effect in the Indian Territory as elsewhere in the
United States; but nothing in this act shall deprive any of the courts
of the civilized nations of exclusive jurisdiction over all cases arising
wherein members of said nations . . . are the sole parties, nor so as
to interfere with the right and powers of said civilized nations to
punish said members for violation of the statutes and laws enacted
by their national councils where such laws are not contrary to the
treaties and laws of the United States."
The question was, therefore, whether the tribal court was subject
to fifth amendment requirements by reason of the Treaty of 1835
made applicable to the court by the Act of 1890. In United States
ex rel. Mackey v. Coxes4 the Supreme Court had construed the same
treaty and had concluded:
They [the Cherokee people] are not only within our jurisdiction,
but the faith of the nation is pledged for their protection. In some
respects they bear the same relation to the federal government as a
territory did in its second grade of government, under the ordinance
of 1787. Such territory passed its own laws, subject to the approval of
congress, and its inhabitants were subject to the constitution and acts
of congress. The principal difference consists in the fact that the
Cherokees enact their own laws, under the restriction stated, appoint
their own officers, and pay their own expenses. This, however, is no
reason why the laws and proceedings of the Cherokee territory, so far
as relates to rights claimed under them, should not be placed upon the
same footing as other territories in the Union. It is not a foreign, but
a domestic territory,-a territory which originated under our Constitution and laws. . ..
82. 14 Stat. 799, 803 (1866).
83. 26 Stat. 81 (1890).
84. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 100 (1855).
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The Cherokee country, we think, may be considered a territory of
the United States, within the act of 1812. In no respect can it be
considered a foreign State or territory, as it is within our jurisdiction
and subject to our laws. 8
Following Coxe and the reasonably clear language of the applicable
treaty and law, the Court could have held that the Cherokee Nation
was a creature of the federal government to whose actions the Constitution is applicable.
However, the Court affirmed judgment discharging the writ, thus
denying the applicability of the Constitution to the Cherokee Nation. Whether the fifth amendment applied depended, the Court
reasoned, upon whether federal or tribal power was exercised. s" The
fifth amendment (and presumably other provisions of the Bill of
Rights) applies only to the federal government; it cannot apply to
an Indian tribe unless the tribe exercises powers "created by and
springing from" the federal government. Congress' right "to regulate the manner in which the local powers of the Cherokee Nation
shall be exercised does not render such local powers Federal powers
'8
arising from and created by the Constitution of the United States. 7
The question was whether Congress had in fact exercised such
powers in the particular case; constitutional applicability will thus
depend on a question of fact. With respect to the Cherokee Nation,
however, the Court held that the matter was governed by Justice
Marshall's decisions in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia8 and Worcester v. Georgia,s9 which indicated that the power of the Cherokee
Nation to govern itself derived from primordial right. The Coxe
decision was not cited.
It is hard to understand why the Court relied on Marshall's description of the Cherokee Nation sixty years before and ignored the
intervening history of the uprooting of the tribe from its homelands
85. Id. at 103-04.

86. "The case in this regard therefore depends upon whether the powers of local
government exercised by the Cherokee Nation are Federal powers created by and
springing from the Constitution of the United States, and hence controlled by the
Fifth Amendment to that Constitution, or whether they are local powers not created
by the Constitution, although subject to its general provisions and the paramount authority of Congress. The repeated adjudications of this court have long since answered
the former question in the negative." Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 382-83.
87. 163 U.S. 376, 384.
88. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
89. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
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in Georgia and its resettlement in the Indian Territory." By 1892
(the year involved in the case) the Cherokee Nation exercised
powers of self-government not under a claim of tribal right but under
the domination of Congress. 9 '
Whether Talton v. Mayes was correctly decided on its facts is
not pertinent. What is important is the holding: the United States
Constitution is applicable to an Indian tribe which exercises powers
derived from Congress. In Barta the tribe had been organized
under the Indian Reorganization Act on January 15, 1936.92
Therefore, the Court should have applied Talton v. Mayes by
analyzing the effect of such organization. It should have concluded
that the Act extinguished any primordial sovereignty and that the
tribe had enacted the questioned tax by the exercise of federal
powers under the Act and the specific approval of the Secretary.
The Constitution, under Talton v. Mayes, was therefore applicable.
But the Court could undoubtedly have upheld the tax under constitutional standards.
The correct application of Talton v. Mayes is illustrated by the
Ninth Circuit's decision in Colliflower v. Garland.9 3 There, the
court granted a writ of habeas corpus to a Gros Ventre Indian on
allegations that procedures followed by the Court of Indian Offenses on the Fort Belknap Reservation, in convicting her of an
offense against another Indian, did not comport with the requirements of the fourth and fifth amendments. The court reasoned that
the Court of Indian Offenses had been established under regulations
of the Bureau of Indian Affairs and supported by federal appropriations; it held that "it is pure fiction to say that the Indian courts
functioning in the Fort Belknap Indian community are not in part,
at least, arms of the federal government." 94 More recently, in
Wakaksan v. United States,9" the court appeared to have assumed

the applicability of constitutional provisions to criminal procedures
90. The history is generally reviewed at U.S. Dep't of Interior, Federal Indian
Law 987-99 (1966).
91. Although the Nation was still allowed a measure of self-government under the
Act of May 2, 1890, that right was limited, by Section 31, 26 Stat. 96, to tribal laws
which "are not contrary to the treaties and laws of the United States." The Nation
was shortly to be destroyed by the Acts of June 28, 1898, 30 Stat. 495. and April 26,
1906, 34 Stat. 137.
92. U.S. Dep't of Interior Federal Indian Law 410 n. 29 (1966).
93. 342 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1965).
94. Id. at 378-79. See 26 Mont. L. Rev. 235 (1965).
95. 367 F.2d 639 (8th Cir. 1966).
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of the Devils Lake Sioux Indian Reservation, at least where an
Indian is charged with a crime under federal law.
The Barta decision may be significant because it held Talton v.
Mayes applicable in a case involving tribal action against a nonIndian. Although the court in Barta did not consider whether Talton
v. Mayes should be distinguished because the tribal tax did not affect
a tribal member, Talton v. Mayes itself does not suggest that the
doctrine enunciated should be limited to cases involving Indian complainants. Indeed, the doctrine seems more pertinent in cases of
tribal action against non-Indians. If the doctrine of residual sovereignty is cast aside, Talton v. Mayes should establish that any
tribe organized under the Indian Reorganization Act or, like the
Navajos, whose government functions wholly under secretarial
authority, exercises ,as a matter of fact, federal rather than primordial powers; the United States Constitution will therefore apply to
any tribal action affecting non-members of the tribe.
Applicability of the Constitution to disputes involving Indian
tribes will, of course, mean federal question jurisdiction in the
federal courts. It will also revive an area of constitutional jurisprudence which has languished since the adoption of the Tucker
Act.96 In United States v. Lee,9 7 the Court held that violation of a
constitutional right requires the courts to supply a remedy; it
ejected federal officers from real estate illegally acquired by the
United States. The Court has recently indicated that Lee will not be
followed where the Tucker Act provides a remedy for an unconstitutional taking by the United States. 9 8 But where an Indian tribe is
guilty of a "taking" the Tucker Act is presumably inapplicable,9 9
and Lee should require judicial action against the tribe directly.
Since Congress no longer provides relief from Indian "depredations,"' 100 judicial intervention will not violate any established congressional policies.
96. 28 U.S.C. § 1491.
97. 106 U.S. 196 (1882).
98. Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643 (1962). See Jaffe, op. cit. supra note 43, at
213-231.
99. If the tribe were deemed a Federal "instrumentality", the Tucker Act might
be applicable. Cf. Larson v. Domestic & Foresign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682
(1949).
100. Although Indian tribes were traditionally held responsible for the acts of
their members, Brown v. United States, 32 Ct. Cl. 432 (1897) ; U.S. Dep't of Interior
Federal Indian Law 474 (1966), Congress' historical policy was to afford victims of
Indian "depredations" indemnity from the United States if satisfaction could not be
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Public Law 90-284, signed by the President on April 11, 1968,11
made applicable to any "Indian tribe in exercising powers of selfgovernment" ten elements of the United States Constitution.0 2
obtained from the tribe. The Act of May 19, 1796, 1 Stat. 469, guaranteed "an eventual
indemnification" if a remedy could not be provided by such administrative action
as charging the loss against tribal annuities. The indemnification was not provided
until 1891, when the Act of March 3, 26 Stat. 851, conferred jurisdiction on the Court
of Claims to determine claims arising after July 1, 1865, presented before March 3,
1891. The vestigial survivor of the indemnification policy is 25 U.S.C. §229, which
authorizes the President "to obtain satisfaction for the injury". It seems doubtful that
that statute creates an administrative remedy which would have to be exhausted before
a court could act under United States 'v. Lee. See Opinion of August 1, 1888, 19 Op.
Att'y Gen. 173 (1888), holding that redress for a taking of cattle under authority of
an ordinance of the Cherokee Nation should be sought in the courts on the theory that
the tribal act was a taking which violated the U.S. Constitution.
101. 82Stat. 73 (1968).
102. Title II of the Act provides as follows:
"No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall"(1) make or enforce any law prohibiting the free exercise of religion,
or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people
peaceably to assembly and to petition for a redress of grievances;
"(2) violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable search and seizures, nor issue
warrants, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be
seized;
"(3) subject any person for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy;
"(4) compel any person in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself;
"(5) take any private property for a public use without just compensation;
"(6) deny to any person in a criminal proceeding the right to a speedy
and public trial, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation,
to be confronted with the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and at his own expense to have the
assistance of counsel for his defense;
"(7) require excessive bail, impose excessive fines, inflict cruel and
unusual punishments, and in no event impose for conviction of any one offense,
any penalty or punishment greater than imprisonment for a term of six
months or a fine of $500, or both;
"(8) deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its
laws or deprive any person of liberty or property without due process of law;
"(9) pass any bill of attainder or ex post facto law; or
"(10) deny to any person accused of an offense punishable by imprisonment the right, upon request, to a trial by jury of not less than six persons."
That Title also provides for issuance of writs and habeas corpus by federal courts "to
test the legality of . . . detention by order of an Indian tribe."
Title III of the Act directs the Secretary to recommend to Congress a "model code
to govern the administration of justice by courts of Indian offenses on Indian reservations." Title IV gives federal consent to state assumption of criminal or civil jurisdiction over "areas of Indian country" within the state, subject to the consent of the
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Although the law does not contain a special grant of jurisdiction to
the federal courts to hear cases arising thereunder, federal question
jurisdiction will exist in cases raising due process and equal protection issues. However, suit against an Indian tribe under that Act
might be blocked by "sovereign immunity" if the proposed Indian
Resources Development Act is not passed. At the present time
courts have the following broad areas of jurisdiction in Indian cases:
1. Federal courts will have federal question jurisdiction in an
action against Indian tribes where due process or equal protection
issues are raised, unless the action is barred by tribal failure to waive
immunity from suit.
2. Federal courts will have jurisdiction of actions (a) against
tribal corporations established under the Indian Reorganization
Act subject to ordinary jurisdictional requirements, and (b) after
enactment of the pending bill, against tribal corporations established
thereunder.
3. State courts should have concurrent jurisdiction with the
federal courts over cases involving Indian tribes or tribal corporations without regard to Williams v. Lee because such cases are not
justiciable in tribal courts. (It is not clear whether the language of
the pending bill creating federal court jurisdiction over actions
involving tribal corporations or those against Indian tribes might
be construed to create exclusive federal court jurisdiction.)
To the extent that jurisdiction has not been expressly granted by
Congress the courts should not hesitate to intervene in disputes involving Indians if intervention would not violate any discernible
congressional policy. The doctrine of residual sovereignty should be
discarded with respect to all tribes organized under the Indian Reorganization Act or exercising governmental powers only with
Secretarial approval, and Williams v. Lee should be restricted to
cases where exclusive tribal court jurisdiction has been intended by
Congress.
If the notion that courts should not interfere in Indian affairs is
relevant in any case, it would be a case where judicial intervention
Indians involved. See note 58 supra. Title V adds assault to the crimes specified in
18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1964). Title VI provides for implied approval of tribal attorney's
contracts if the Secretary fails to approve or disapprove within 90 days, and Title
VII authorizes revisions of certain Indian law materials.
Although the provisions of the Act relating to criminal matters are new and important, they are passed over here because they have limited bearing on commercial or
industrial relations with Indian tribes.
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would, as a matter of fact, disrupt tribal cultural relations. Yet the
courts never mention anticipated cultural aftershocks as a reason for
staying the judicial hand. In many cases, perhaps, both court and
counsel believe any adverse cultural effects of a decision are too remote to merit consideration. Nevertheless, the courts would be acting with greater realism if they actively sought to gauge the cultural
consequences of a possible judicial decision-and refused to act
because of anticipated destruction of cultural values-rather than to
refuse remedies because of adherence to outworn doctrines.
If the pending bill is not enacted, the courts should nevertheless
develop new perspectives and policies in cases involving disputes
between Indian tribes and the non-Indians with whom they deal. The
relevant principles are available if the precedents of the 19th century are properly distinguished. The judicial objective should be to
make business relations with Indian tribes comparable to those with
ordinary municipal corporations. Doing business "in Indian country"
should not involve the exotic legal risks created by erroneous interpretations of the leading cases.

